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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: mood, mainly bad

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Thursday, 19 March 2015. Mood, mainly bad. Heidegger tells us that all our comprehending encounters with this or that are framed by mood. Perhaps on some or other understanding of 'mood' that will pass. But isn't there another, everyday, understanding of mood which has it playing a less hegemomic role in the disclosure of our worlds? Or perhaps we can approach the matter differently. When we say 'Oh, you are. In a good mood! Is most often - are they not? Of adaptive corporeal reckoning with our boons and...

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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: March 2015

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Thursday, 19 March 2015. Mood, mainly bad. Heidegger tells us that all our comprehending encounters with this or that are framed by mood. Perhaps on some or other understanding of 'mood' that will pass. But isn't there another, everyday, understanding of mood which has it playing a less hegemomic role in the disclosure of our worlds? Or perhaps we can approach the matter differently. When we say 'Oh, you are. In a good mood! Is most often - are they not? Of adaptive corporeal reckoning with our boons and...

clinicalphilosophy.blogspot.com

Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: October 2014

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Saturday, 25 October 2014. Against objectivist understandings of psychotherapeutic action. Or perhaps it's just the light getting brighter now in the springtime that makes me feel better? Really working, or was it just that I had some hope for a while that here was something, finally, that could help me? Hope that has now been spent, now that I'm back facing the same old depressing realities of the same old life and the same old misery-generating nervous system with which to encounter it? Is it a placebo?

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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: more than mentalising

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Sunday, 19 April 2015. Just a note, a sketch of an argument, not yet referenced, not yet tested on the source material. Etc) The idea of the disorder's apt therapy is then said to be to encourage mentalising in the midst of, or at least before and after, that emotional turmoil which tends to derail it and send the patient off into situations of chronically dysregulated affect. I said this is rather too breezy because, it seems to me, it risks portraying the work of therapy in such instances in far too.

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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: April 2015

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Sunday, 19 April 2015. Just a note, a sketch of an argument, not yet referenced, not yet tested on the source material. Etc) The idea of the disorder's apt therapy is then said to be to encourage mentalising in the midst of, or at least before and after, that emotional turmoil which tends to derail it and send the patient off into situations of chronically dysregulated affect. I said this is rather too breezy because, it seems to me, it risks portraying the work of therapy in such instances in far too.

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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: September 2013

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Sunday, 22 September 2013. Psychosis: a dynamical systems approach. Today I'm going to outline a template for understanding psychosis using dynamic systems theory. It is not itself a theory, being far too rudimentary. But it is perhaps a scaffold on which a theory could be built. Another way in which the dynamic systems framework is, I hope, relevant is that it is not intended as a metaphor for a psychological. I say: not a psychological. Of normal mindedness which itself becomes unbearable and unfeasibl...

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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: June 2014

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Tuesday, 17 June 2014. Discussions of transference in psychological manuals tend, it seems to me, to be rather formulaic and to miss the more significant contours of the clinical phenomenon. Here's my working attempt at elucidating more cleanly the phenomenology of some of what tends to get called by that name. The main difference, from standard approaches, that I wish to stress here concerns what normally prevents. I Some understandings of transference stress to us the disposition to project the form of...

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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: January 2015

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Tuesday, 6 January 2015. Understanding Procrastination: Academic Learning as an Emotional Experience. Written for students at the University of Oxford]. All too often the ways we try to increase our efficiency and control our procrastination. The boredom; then with a modest compassion to non-judgementally allow. Ourselves to be bored; next to firmly but respectfully encourage. Simply get on with the work. Finally to provide rewards. Breaking it down, etc. 3 Next we note that a difficult academic task can...

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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: November 2013

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Monday, 25 November 2013. Review of Jon Frederickson's 'Co-Creating Change: Effective Dynamic Therapy Techniques'. Draft of review -. European Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling. Vol 16, Iss 1, January 2014, pages 90-93. Whilst his model is largely faithful to Davanloo’s ISTDP, we nevertheless hear a lot of Frederickson’s distinctive voice throughout, perhaps best. Epitomised in his highly active, firm, compassionate yet. Defences that keep feelings, at bay (ch. 4). Significant in ISTDP is its focu...

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Philosophical Perspectives in Clinical Psychology: February 2014

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Monday, 3 February 2014. An enactivist conception of hallucination. Instead they are hallucinating - whatever that is! In hallucination we have neither act nor object, but are inclined to posit both (the inner beholding of an inner object). We need to resist that inclination, since it obscures the explanandum. Of what their bodies. Subscribe to: Posts (Atom). The pain that breaks. Institute of mental health. International network of philosophy and psychiatry. An enactivist conception of hallucination.